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287 
I’LL MAKE HIM AN OFFER HE CAN’T REFUSE: A 
PROPOSED MODEL FOR ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE 
RESOLUTION IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY DISPUTES 
Kevin M. Lemley∗  
Aside from theft, contract murder, racketeering, and a score of 
other crimes, the mafia functions in a fashion similar to the modern 
judicial system.  Occasionally, the families go to war (litigation).  
Alternatively, the heads of the families arrange formal meetings to 
resolve disputes (mediation).  And, most commonly, the family heads 
give orders concerning smaller disputes (arbitration).  Granted, remedies 
in the mafia are severe: someone usually ends up beaten or lying next to 
Jimmy Hoffa.  However, the mafia system of dispute resolution reflects 
the American court system.  While at times the mafia engages in full-
scale war, most often the parties resolve disputes with sit-downs or 
decisions from the family heads.  While the mafia hardly serves as a 
glowing role model, its system of dispute resolution provides valuable 
insights for private parties to more efficiently handle their disputes. 
This article will discuss alternative dispute resolution in intellectual 
property disputes.  A conceptual approach will be applied in an effort to 
better formulate the parties’ strategies towards litigation or alternative 
dispute resolution.  Alternative dispute resolution (ADR) is a maturing 
area of the law, and its application to intellectual property disputes is 
complicated.1  These complications make any analysis difficult to 
organize.  This article will discuss the underlying components of ADR 
and intellectual property disputes in a step-by-step fashion.  Part I of this 
 
∗  Kevin M. Lemley; LL.M., Intellectual Property, expected May 2005; J.D., University of Arkansas 
at Little Rock School of Law, 2003. The author is of counsel to the law offices of Berry D. Bowen 
in Houston, Texas, and can be reached at kevinmlemley@yahoo.com. I would like to thank my 
incredible wife and best friend, Jenny Lemley, without whom this article never would have been 
written. I would also like to thank Mark A. Lemley and Kelly Browe Olson for their helpful 
comments and revisions of previous drafts.  
 1. See generally Scott H. Blackmand & Rebecca M. McNeill, Alternative Dispute Resolution 
in Commercial Intellectual Property Disputes, 47 AM. U. L. REV. 1709 (1998) (discussing the 
development of alternative dispute resolution and its application to intellectual property disputes). 
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article discusses intellectual property rights and presents two conceptual 
interests underlying these rights.  Deciding whether to litigate or pursue 
ADR demands a thorough understanding of what legal rights are in 
dispute.2  Part II focuses on the remedies available to intellectual 
property owners (potential liability to infringers) to effectively ascertain 
the “prize” of the dispute.  Part III provides background information on 
various forms of ADR as well as the Alternative Dispute Resolution 
Act.3  This section will serve as guidance for later sections, primarily the 
proposal in Part V.  Part IV analyzes the advantages/risks calculi for 
intellectual property owners and infringers in proceeding to trial or 
pursuing ADR.  Part V presents a sophisticated proposal for dispute 
resolution in intellectual property disputes.  Part VI discusses the effects 
of this proposal.  The conceptual approach focusing on the parties’ 
underlying interests offers a pragmatic solution to the litigation/ADR 
dilemma.  In this article, one crucial issue concerning intellectual 
property disputes emerges: the parties’ interests often align.  With this 
realization, a system of ADR better serves the parties’ interests and 
creates tailored solutions to their complicated disputes. 
I.  INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 
Intellectual property law seeks to “provide incentives for 
innovation . . . by establishing enforceable property rights for the 
creators of new and useful products, more efficient processes, and 
original works of expression.”4  Simply put, intellectual property law 
grants rights to inventors and innovators so they can profit from their 
developments.5  With the ability to profit, intellectual property owners 
have an incentive to produce new innovations for society to enjoy.6 
Without intellectual property rights, infringers could easily exploit these 
new innovations and steal profits from the owners.7  Innovators would 
 
 2. See Kevin R. Casey, Alternate Dispute Resolution and Patent Law, 3 FED CIR. B.J. 1, 6-
12 (1993) (discussing factors that parties should consider in deciding between ADR and litigation, 
as well as indicating which type of ADR to use). 
 3. See Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-315, 112 Stat. 2993 
(1998). 
 4. Daniel B. Ravicher & Shani C. Dilloff, Antitrust Scrutiny of Intellectual Property 
Exploitation: It Just Don’t Make No Kind of Sense, 8 SW. J. L. & TRADE AM. 83, 89 (2001-2002) 
(citing U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission, Antitrust Guidelines for the 
Licensing of Intellectual Property § 1.0 (April 6, 1995), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/ipguide.htm (last visited 10/25/03)). 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
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have no economic incentives to innovate, and society would ultimately 
suffer the loss.8 
Intellectual property law is divided into four primary areas: patent, 
copyright, trademark, and trade secret.9  Intellectual property consists of 
a bundle of rights held by the owner of the particular intellectual 
property asset (IPA).10  Every stick in the bundle grants the intellectual 
property owner a specific right with regard to the IPA.11  Each area of 
intellectual property consists of its own protocol to determine what 
subject matter may receive protection, how the owner may achieve this 
protection, and how long the IPA receives protection.12  Additionally, 
each area of intellectual property provides legal remedies for 
infringement as well as fair use provisions available to the public.13  Like 
tangible property, the paramount right that intellectual property vests in 
the owner is the right to exclude others from use.14  Intellectual property 
is distinguished from tangible property, but each form of intellectual 
property is also distinguished from the other forms.15  To understand 
these distinctions, one must analyze the bundle of rights each IPA 
grants.16 
Each area of intellectual property conveys a different set of rights 
and extends protection for a different period of time.  Copyright law 
vests into authors the exclusive rights of reproduction, distribution, 
creation of derivative works, performance, and display.17  Copyright 
 
 8. Id.  Imagine if the U.S. never adopted a patent law system.  People like Thomas Edison 
would likely have spent their lives performing insignificant jobs rather than designing technological 
advancements to benefit society. 
 9. Id.  While Ravicher and Dilloff delete trade secrets from the list, trade secrets compare a 
prominent area of intellectual property law.  Compare Ravicher & Dilloff, supra note 4, with 
HENRY H. PERRITT, JR., TRADE SECRETS: A PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE, ch. 2 (1994). 
 10. PERRITT, supra note 9, at 36.  A more academic definition describes intellectual property 
as containing two primary components: creative expression coupled with public willingness to 
recognize the property right.  Thus, intellectual property essentially permits a person to own 
knowledge.  Lori M. Berg, Comment, The North American Free Trade Agreement & Protection of 
Intellectual Property: A Converging View, 5 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 99, 102 (1995). 
 11. PERRITT, supra note 9, at 36. 
 12. Laurinda L. Hicks & James R. Holbein, Convergence of National Intellectual Property 
Norms in International Trading Agreements, 12 AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 769, 771 (1997). 
 13. Id.  It is important to note that the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (2003), and Copyright 
Act, 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2003), both expressly provide fair use provisions.  Conversely, the 
countervailing fair use provisions in patent and trade secret law result as a product of case law rather 
than statutory requirement. 
 14. Hicks & Holbein, supra note 12, at 771-772. 
 15. PERRITT, supra note 9, at ch. 2. 
 16. Id. 
 17. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2003). 
3
Lemley: ADR in Intellectual Property Disputes
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2004
LEMLEY1.DOC 4/5/2004  11:22 AM 
290 AKRON LAW REVIEW [37:287 
protection spans the life of the author plus 70 years.18  A trademark is 
any word, name, symbol, or device or any combination thereof used to 
identify one’s goods and distinguish them from those sold by others.19  
Trademark law offers protection forever so long as the owner renews the 
mark.20  Patents protect inventions that are useful, new, and non-
obvious.21  A patent protects the invention for 20 years from the filing of 
the patent.22  Trade secrets consist of any secret, valuable information 
that can be used in business to gain an actual or potential advantage.23  
Trade secret protection lasts indefinitely until competitors or the general 
public discovers the secret information.24 
A.  Value of Intellectual Property Rights 
Intellectual property consists of heavy fixed costs and low marginal 
costs.25  Intellectual property requires significant expense to create 
because owners must commit substantial amounts of funds and time to 
develop each IPA.26  Once created, the owner alone has incurred the 
initial investment to develop the IPA, and an infringer can copy the IPA 
at a minimum expense.  For some IPAs, the marginal cost is so low the 
cost is virtually nonexistent.27  Without legal protection, infringers have 
the power to free ride the intellectual property, and the owner alone 
incurs the substantial fixed costs.28  Absent legal protection, infringers 
essentially steal the initial investment of the owner and can sell their 
infringing product at the lower marginal cost.29  The owner is forced to 
sell at the marginal cost in order to retain any significant market share.30  
 
 18. 17 U.S.C. § 302 (2001). 
 19. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2001). 
 20. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1058-1059 (2001). 
 21. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103 (2001). 
 22. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2001). 
 23. Edward T. Ellis & Chungmoon Choi, Protection of Intangible Business Assets: Trade 
Secrets in the Age of Federal Computer Legislation, ALI-ABA COURSE MATERIALS J., July 2002, 
at 491, 502-503.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 (1995). 
 24. Daniel P. Powell, An Introduction to the Law of Trade Secrets, 23 COLO. LAW. 2125, 
2125 (1994). 
 25. Richard A. Posner, Antitrust in the New Economy, ALI-ABA COURSE MATERIALS J., 
Sept. 2000, at 115, 118. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Property and Innovation in the Global Information Infrastructure, 
1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 261, 276 (1996). 
 30. Id.  Professor Perritt has designed excellent equations graphing the costs of the owner, the 
pirate, and the free ride problem.  While the depth of the equations exceeds the scope of this article, 
the equations provide a better understanding of how intellectual property rights protect the owner’s 
4
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Selling at this price, the owner can never recover the heavy fixed costs 
of developing the intellectual property.31 
Intellectual property law allows the owner, rather than infringers, to 
derive economic value from the IPA.32  As evidence of this economic 
value, owners currently generate revenue from their IPAs.33  Owners use 
intellectual property to secure substantial amounts of borrowed capital.34  
Numerous companies receive a substantial amount of investment dollars 
based on the companies’ intellectual property rights.35  Moreover, these 
companies spend an increasing amount of money each year to obtain 
protection for their intellectual property rights.36  Despite their economic 
value, IPAs alone do not generate market power.  Market power 
constitutes the ability to generate profits at higher than competitive 
levels for a significant period of time.37  In other words, market power is 
the ability to establish prices above the marginal cost.38  The IPA is 
merely one component in a production process that comprises several 
complementary factors.39  These complementary factors include 
manufacturing, distribution, marketing, and labor components.40  The 
intellectual property owner must utilize these factors in conjunction with 
the IPA to realize the commercial value of the IPA.41 
Even with an efficient system to realize commercial value, rarely 
can the owner easily value the IPA.42  An IPA has zero value if it is ruled 
invalid or if legal protection expires.43  Aside from these extremes, 
 
business interests. 
 31. Id. 
 32. See Posner, supra note 25, at 118. 
 33. Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, Prior Restraints and Intellectual Property: The Clash 
Between Intellectual Property and the First Amendment from an Economic Perspective, 12 
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1, 13 (2001). 
 34. See Judith L. Church, Structuring Deals Involving Intellectual Property Assets, 706 
PRACTISING L. INST.: PAT., COPYRIGHTS, TRADEMARKS, & LITERARY PROP. COURSE HANDBOOK 
SERIES 199 (2002) (providing a thorough discussion of the use of intellectual property as security 
for borrowed capital). 
 35. Beckerman-Rodau, supra note 33, at 13. 
 36. Id. 
 37. RAYMOND T. NIMMER, THE LAW OF COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY: RIGHTS LICENSES 
LIABILITIES, app. D, §2.2 (2002). 
 38. Richard J. Gilbert & Willard K. Tom, Is Innovation King at the Antitrust Agencies?  The 
Intellectual Property Guidelines Five Years Later, 69 ANTITRUST L.J. 43, 46 (2001). 
 39. NIMMER, supra note 37, at app. D, §2.3. 
 40. Id.  (complementary factors may also include other intellectual property devices). 
 41. Id. 
 42. Ted Hagelin, A New Method to Value Intellectual Property, 30 AIPLA Q.J. 353, 357 
(2002). 
 43. Id. 
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pinpointing the value of the IPA is a difficult task.44  The most 
fundamental concept regarding value is simply stated: value does not 
equal price.45  Price only defines the dollar amount at which the IPA 
trades in a market.46  Value defines the utility of the IPA to the buyer 
and seller.47  The buyer and seller base the exchange on the distinction 
between value and price.48  If the price exceeds the seller’s value and 
remains below the buyer’s value, the exchange will occur and both 
parties will be better off.49  Price and value share an integral relation.50  
Price is the perceived value of the IPA to the respective parties; i.e., it is 
the concrete number where the parties commit to the exchange.51  Value 
is the range of numbers the parties use to negotiate a price.52 
The purpose of this article is not to discuss methods to calculate a 
monetary figure for intellectual property rights.  However, it is important 
for the intellectual property owner to reasonably understand the value of 
the disputed IPA.53  A large volume of scholarship is produced 
concerning intellectual property, but a very small portion focus on the 
actual nature of intellectual property rights.  When considering 
alternative dispute resolution for intellectual property adjudication, the 
focus should shift backward, to the fundamentals of intellectual property 
rights, before proceeding forward to strategic decisions.  The owner 
must completely understand the rights at stake before deciding whether 
to settle, litigate, or enter a form of alternative dispute resolution.  For a 
patent, the owner has a very limited time to profit solely from the 
patent.54  Is it worth more to aggressively protect the patent at all costs or 
to seek licensing profits for the remainder of the term?  For a trade 
secret, time is not an issue, but maintaining the secret is imperative.55  Is 
it worth the risk of losing the secret to obtain licensing profits?  
Trademarks and copyrights have no time or secrecy considerations for 
 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. at 358. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Ted Hagelin, A New Method to Value Intellectual Property, 30 AIPLA Q.J. 353, 357 
(2002). 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id.  While establishing a monetary figure on intellectual property rights exceeds the scope 
of this article, it is relevant to note that Professor Hagelin has developed an intriguing valuation 
model for intellectual property rights called the Competitive Advantage Valuation.  Id. at 397. 
 53. Id. at 355. 
 54. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2001). 
 55. See Powell, supra note 24, at 2125. 
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the initial owner, but the owner must still decide between profiting on 
his own or profiting from licensing fees.  For each decision, the owner 
must evaluate the rights at stake and the potential profitability from 
licensing or not. 
Likewise, the infringer must completely understand the potential 
liability at stake before making the same decisions.  What exactly does 
the owner want to protect and, more importantly, why does the owner 
want to protect it?  Is the potential liability worth the potential profits?  
The infringer must contemplate the profitability from freely using the 
IPA and the profitability if he must pay a licensing fee for use.  How can 
the infringer utilize the nature of the intellectual property right to obtain 
a negotiating advantage?  For licensing of a trade secret, the infringer 
may be able to secure a lower royalty rate by assuming additional, 
creative safeguards to protect the secret.  The infringer may obtain the 
same advantage on a patent with only a few years left on its term.  The 
infringer faces a similar multitude of considerations in deciding whether 
to litigate or pursue ADR.  Like the intellectual property owner, the 
infringer must reasonably understand the value of the disputed IPA.  To 
adequately value the intellectual property rights, both owners and 
infringers must understand and analyze the two major interests 
comprising intellectual property rights. 
B.  The Two Major Interests Comprising Intellectual Property Rights 
Excluding others from use is the intellectual property owner’s 
definitive property right.56  However, this principle provides only a 
superficial understanding of the intellectual property owner’s rights.  To 
fully understand these rights, one must examine the right to exclude in 
the context of the intellectual property owner’s interests to exclude.  This 
article proposes that the right to exclude consists of two interests: 
fundamental and adversarial.57  Under the fundamental interest, the 
intellectual property owner seeks to derive the value of his IPA.  Under 
the adversarial interest, the intellectual property owner seeks to exclude 
 
 56. See Hicks & Holbein, supra note 12, at 771-72. 
 57. See Doris E. Long, The New Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual 
Property: A Workable Balance or a Practitioner’s Nightmare?, 414 PRACTISING L. INST.: PAT., 
COPYRIGHTS, TRADEMARKS, & LITERARY PROP.COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 381, 393 (1995) 
(identifying the right to exclude as the right to profit); Jennifer Mills, Notes & Comments, 
Alternative Dispute Resolution in International Intellectual Property Disputes, 11 OHIO ST. J. ON 
DISP. RESOL. 227 (1996) (explaining the value of intellectual property resides in the two facets of 
exclusive use and licensing by the owner).  This article extends these concepts by compounding the 
right to exclude into two interests: the interest to exclude and the interest to profit. 
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others from using his IPA.  The fundamental and adversarial interests are 
not mutually exclusive; often the intellectual property owner will 
commit to a hybrid of the two interests. 
The right to exclude generally is not divided into the fundamental 
and adversarial interests given the complexity and close relationship 
between the two.  The fundamental interest derives from the adversarial 
interest; that is, the owner cannot seek profit without the power to 
exclude.  Conversely, the adversarial interest may exist in the complete 
absence of the fundamental interest.  Any given intellectual property 
owner may only desire one interest, but another owner may desire a 
complicated hybrid of the two interests.  Moreover, an owner’s 
commitment to each IPA interest will vary, depending on the 
circumstances of the situation.  For example, an owner will favor the 
adversarial interest when a competitor seeks to use the IPA, but the same 
owner may favor the fundamental interest when a non-competitor wishes 
to enter a licensing agreement. 
For a clearer demonstration of these concepts, intellectual property 
may be analogized to tangible property, for the same two interests apply 
to tangible property.58  Consider an investor trading corporate stocks.  
The investor buys and sells stocks in hopes of making a profit.  The 
investor is wholly committed to the fundamental interest.  While the 
investor receives certificates for the stocks he buys, he never receives a 
physical “thing.”  He is not concerned with preventing others from using 
his “thing.”  Rather, he hopes to make a profit by selling the stocks at a 
higher price than he purchased.  The investor will sell the stock as soon 
as he can receive a high enough price to realize an acceptable profit. 
Consider the same investor inheriting a family heirloom, perhaps a 
quilt his grandmother sewed.  The heirloom is sentimentally priceless to 
the investor.  The investor is wholly concerned with his adversarial 
interest in the quilt.  He has no desire to make a profit; he only wishes to 
enjoy exclusive possession of the heirloom.  In other words, his focus is 
to exclude others from taking or using the heirloom.  This interest will 
never shift; whether a child seeks the quilt for free or an antique dealer 
seeks the quilt for millions of dollars.  No one can separate the investor 
from the quilt, and any negotiation pursuing this objective would prove 
fruitless. 
 
 58. See Gilbert & Tom, supra note 38, at 44 (at least in the context of antitrust analysis, 
intellectual property undergoes a similar analysis as tangible property); Long, supra note 57, at 393 
(the right to exclude vested in intellectual property rights is similar to the same rights conferred in 
tangible property).  Analogizing intellectual property with tangible property is offered for the 
purposes of illustrating the fundamental and adversarial interests. 
8
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Consider once again the same investor buying a house.  People buy 
houses to have a place to live, but houses also serve as profitable 
investments.  Here, the investor is committed to a hybrid of the 
fundamental and adversarial interests.  He does not want anyone 
entering or using his house without his permission during his use of the 
house as a residence.  Also, he wants the market value of the house to 
increase.  At some point in time, he may like to sell the house for a 
profit.  Early in his ownership of the house, the investor commits to the 
adversarial interest.  At some later point, the investor shifts to the 
fundamental interest when he is ready to sell.  At what time this shift 
occurs depends on several factors including the investor’s wishes and 
market conditions.59 
These illustrations present three possible categories of intellectual 
property owners: OF, OA, and O.  OF represents an intellectual property 
owner committed to the fundamental interest. This owner will realize 
profits from his own use as well as from licensing fees.  OA represents an 
intellectual property owner committed to the adversarial interest.  This 
owner will disregard any profits from licensing fees.  O represents an 
intellectual property owner committed to a hybrid that approximately 
equalizes the two interests.  O initially desires to exclude use altogether, 
but O may be convinced to allow use for payment under acceptable 
terms. 
The owner selects his interest commitment based upon one primary 
question: how can I maximize the value of my intellectual property?  A 
number of factors such as market conditions, available resources, and the 
circumstances of the current legal dispute can change the answer to this 
question.  As a result, a change in any number of circumstances may 
cause an OA to shift to an OF, or vice versa.  The numerous potential 
causes of this shift show the changeable nature of an intellectual 
property owner’s commitment.  This changeable nature of the owner’s 
commitment is the primary distinction against the infringer’s 
commitment. 
 
 59. While the investor’s purchase of a house is an excellent example of the hybrid, a different 
consumer may just as easily commit to the fundamental or adversarial interests when purchasing a 
house.  A retiring couple purchasing their “dream house” will commit to the adversarial interest.  
An aggressive consumer seeking to gain huge profits in the real estate market will commit to the 
fundamental interest.  The relevant point is that any consumer may commit to the fundamental 
interest, adversarial interest, or the hybrid for any property at any given time. 
9
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C.  Conceptualizing the Two Interests for Intellectual Property 
Infringers 
The fundamental and adversarial interests apply with equal force to 
intellectual property infringers.60  As discussed above, owners exercise 
the two interests as components of ownership.  Infringers exercise the 
interests as components of the privilege to freely use.  The privilege to 
freely use is similarly divided into the fundamental and adversarial 
interests.  Under the fundamental interest, the infringer desires the 
privilege to freely use the IPA, whether for profit or enjoyment.  This 
infringer understands the owner has legally protected rights and that 
such use will require payments to the owner.  Under the adversarial 
interest, the infringer expects to freely use the IPA.  This infringer 
believes the owner either does not have legally protected rights or should 
not have such rights.  This infringer refuses to pay for use because he 
expects just as much right to profit or enjoyment from the IPA as the 
owner.  An infringer committed to the hybrid will desire free use in 
some circumstances but will expect the right to free use in other 
circumstances. 
While the interests for the infringer are the same as those for the 
owner, the motivations behind the infringer’s commitment differ from 
the motivations of an owner.  An infringer may seek to profit from the 
IPA or seek only to freely use the IPA.  However, the infringer’s interest 
commitment exists independently of whether or not the infringer seeks 
to profit from the IPA.  Consider an infringer who downloads MP3 files 
and subsequently listens to music from his computer or an MP3 player.  
The infringer downloads copyrighted music, but he only seeks 
enjoyment.  He does not attempt to profit financially from the 
infringement.  This infringer may commit to either the fundamental or 
the adversarial interest; that is, he may or may not be willing to pay for 
the use.  Consider the same infringer who now runs a CD mixing 
business.  The infringer receives orders from clients and makes 
customized CDs from MP3 files.  The infringer sells the CDs for a 
profit.  Now the infringer realizes profits from the infringement.  
However, the presence of profits does not affect the infringer’s 
commitment.  He still may or may not be willing to pay for the use. 
Despite the disparity in motivations, infringers fall into three 
 
 60. For purposes of this article “infringer” means anyone using an intellectual property device 
without permission from the owner.  Such actions may constitute fair use or another defense to 
infringement.  However, for the sake of clarity, this article will broaden the definition for 
explanatory purposes of the more critical issues presented. 
10
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categories like owners: NF, NA, and N.  NF represents an infringer 
committed to the fundamental interest.  This infringer desires free use 
but understands payment for use will be required.  NA represents an 
infringer committed to the adversarial interest.  This infringer expects 
free use and does not intend to pay for the use.  N represents an infringer 
committed to a hybrid which approximately equalizes the two interests.  
N initially expects to use the IPA without payment, but N can be 
convinced to pay for use under acceptable terms. 
Unlike the intellectual property owner, the infringer is much more 
likely to remain fixed to his initial interest commitment.  While the 
owner’s interest commitment is often determined by asking a business 
question, the infringer looks to a question of right and wrong: Do I have 
the right to freely use the IPA?  Because the infringer selects his 
commitment based upon his distinction between right and wrong, it will 
take a significant change in circumstances to facilitate a shift in the 
infringer’s commitment.  The threat of imminent civil or criminal 
liability is usually the only factor to cause an infringer to shift his 
commitment.  The stronger the threat of liability, the more likely the 
shift will occur.61  Consequently, the infringer’s commitment is less 
changeable than that of the owner. 
D.  Conceptualizing the Two Interests for Intellectual Property Disputes 
Understanding the fundamental and adversarial interests is not a 
purely pedagogical concern.  Conceptualizing the two interests for 
owners and infringers provides the proper insight into the nature of 
intellectual property disputes.  Combining the two interests and the 
hybrid position, nine possible scenarios exist for intellectual property 
disputes: 
 
(1)  OF + NF 
(2)  OF + N 
(3)  O + NF 
(4)  O + N 
(5)  OF + NA 
(6)  O + NA 
 
 61. After its infamous dispute, Napster merged with legitimate music companies to offer legal 
music services.  Joseph A. Sifferd, The Peer-to-Peer Revolution: A Post-Napster Analysis of the 
Rapidly Developing File-Sharing Technology, 4 VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 92, 103-04 (2002).  The 
merger presented a drastic change from Napster’s initial legal position.  In terms of infringer 
interests, Napster shifted its commitment from the adversarial interest to the fundamental interest.  
Unfavorable judgments tend to cause such a shift. 
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(7)  OA + NF 
(8)  OA + N 
(9)  OA + NA 
 
Scenarios (1) - (4) present disputes where both parties are either 
committed to the fundamental interest or to the hybrid.  Scenarios (5) - 
(8) present disputes where one party is committed to the adversarial 
interest but the other party is committed to either the fundamental 
interest or the hybrid.  Scenario (9) presents a dispute where both parties 
are committed to the adversarial interest.  Additionally, this scenario 
encompasses “non-standard”62 intellectual property disputes.  For 
instance, consider two parties engaged in a dispute where both parties 
claim the right to one patent.  Only one party, if any, can obtain the 
patent, and the subsequent limitation on the range of the parties’ interests 
causes these disputes to feature a dispute presented in Scenario (9). 
The nine scenarios, when analyzed through the fundamental and 
adversarial interests, allow focus on the nature of the dispute in terms of 
each party’s perception of its rights. In other words, one may examine 
what the parties want rather than what the law has to offer. Every 
intellectual property dispute will fit into one of the nine scenarios.  A 
typical legal analysis examines disputes in terms of which party is right 
or wrong and what solution the law has to offer.  The nine scenarios 
provide the opportunity to examine disputes in terms of each party’s 
committed interest.  From the latter examination, the question of which 
party is right fades from the forefront.  Rather, the question of how to 
accommodate each party’s interest takes precedence.  To thoroughly 
address this question it is crucial to analyze damages in intellectual 
property cases.  Before transcending the concept of what the law has to 
offer, it is imperative to understand what the law has to offer.  For the 
parties in the dispute, each must become aware of the stakes involved in 
litigation. 
II.  A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF DAMAGES IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
CASES 
Both parties to an intellectual property dispute must have full 
knowledge of the possible damage awards available.  Generally, 
intellectual property owners are businessmen.  They develop their IPAs 
 
 62. A “non-standard” dispute is a distinction solely for the purposes of this article.  There is 
nothing atypical about these disputes, but the distinction serves the function of categorizing these 
disputes with disputes where both parties are committed to the adversarial interest. 
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to create a competitive advantage over their competitors.  Deciding 
whether to litigate or settle is more a business decision than a decision to 
enforce legal rights.  If the cost of enforcing the rights exceeds or nearly 
equals the value of the IPA, the intellectual property owner faces a 
difficult decision.  The infringer, whether he seeks profit from the IPA or 
not, must assess his potential liability for infringement.  If the cost of 
enforced liability exceeds acceptable levels, the infringer faces a 
similarly difficult decision.  Therefore, assessing the possible damages 
in an intellectual property dispute is a paramount concern for both 
parties.  Unfortunately, creating this assessment presents a daunting task. 
A.  Actual Damages and Reasonable Royalty Rates 
Damages are similar among trademark, patent, and copyright 
infringement claims.  Under the Lanham Act, a successful plaintiff in a 
trademark infringement case may win actual damages in the form of 
plaintiff’s damages or defendant’s profits.63  The defendant’s profits “are 
probably the best possible measure of damages available.”64  The Patent 
Act allows damages to compensate for the infringement, and this award 
must at least amount to a reasonable royalty for the use of the 
invention.65  Patent owners most often seek to recover the defendant’s 
profits.  To win these damages, the patent owner must prove “(1) 
demand for the patented product, (2) absence of acceptable non-
infringing substitutes, (3) his manufacturing capability to exploit the 
demand, and (4) the amount of the profit he would have made.”66  The 
Copyright Act provides damages consisting of the copyright owner’s 
actual damages and additional profits enjoyed by the defendant that are 
attributable to the infringement.67  Alternatively, plaintiffs in trademark 
cases, like those in patent cases, may win damages of a reasonable 
royalty rate.68  The reasonable royalty rate is based on hypothetical 
 
 63. 15 U.S.C. § 1117 (2001).  See Nintendo of Am., Inc. v. Dragon Pac. Int’l, 40 F.3d 1007, 
1010 (9th Cir. 1994). 
 64. Polo Fashions, Inc. v. Craftex, Inc., 816 F.2d 145, 149 (4th Cir. 1987). 
 65. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2001).  See Oiness v. Walgreen Co., 88 F.3d 1025, 1029 (Fed. Cir. 
1996). 
 66. Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, 575 F.2d 1152, 1156 (6th Cir. 1978). 
 67. 17 U.S.C. § 504 (2003).  See Nelson-Salabes, Inc. v. Morningside Dev., L.L.C., 284 F.3d 
505, 517 (4th Cir. 2002); E. Am. Trio Prods., Inc. v. Tang Elec. Corp., 97 F. Supp. 2d 395, 419 
(S.D.N.Y. 2000). 
 68. See, e.g., Smithkline Diagnostics, Inc. v. Helena Labs. Corp., 926 F.2d 1161, 1164 (Fed. 
Cir. 1991); Golight, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. 216 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 1182 (D. Colo. 2002); A & 
H Sportswear Co. v. Victoria’s Secret, 967 F. Supp. 1457, 1479 (E.D. Pa. 1997); Wright v. United 
States, 53 Fed. Cl. 466, 469 (Fed. Cl. 2002). 
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negotiations between the parties, had they so negotiated a royalty rate 
(licensing fee).69  However, these damages are rarely awarded in 
trademark cases.70 
Damages in intellectual property disputes are extremely difficult to 
calculate.71  Two primary factors contribute to this difficulty.  First, all 
three intellectual property statutes grant the factfinder wide discretion in 
assigning damage awards.72  As a result, a wide range of possible 
damages exists, and the final trial verdict is always subject to review on 
appeal.  Second, damages from infringement share the same intangible 
nature as intellectual property.73  In other areas of law, such as contract 
disputes and personal injury claims, the plaintiff has concrete proof of 
damages.  The plaintiff will have the written contract or medical bills to 
offer as proof.  Intellectual property owners have no such luxury.  
Intellectual property owners must base their damage calculations on 
circumstantial evidence such as sales trends, marketing expenditures, 
and surveys.74 
B.  Treble/Statutory Damages and Attorney’s Fees 
The Lanham Act allows courts to award treble damages, but such 
an award may not constitute a penalty.75  While the statute does not 
specifically set a standard for treble damages, most courts award treble 
damages based on some variation of willful infringement.76  The 
Lanham Act also provides an award of reasonable attorney fees in 
 
 69. Wright, 53 Fed. Cl. at 469. 
 70. 5 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 
30:85 (4th ed. 2003) (usually when a royalty was awarded, the case involved an infringer continuing 
to use a mark after the license expired). 
 71. See, e.g., Big O Tire Dealers, Inc. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 561 F.2d 1365, 1374 
(10th Cir. 1977); Deering, Milliken & Co. v. Gilbert, 269 F.2d 191, 193-94 (2d Cir. 1959).  See Roy 
J. Epstein, The Market Share Rule With Price Erosion: Patent Infringement Lost Profits Damages 
After Crystal, 31 AIPLA Q. J. 1, 1 (2003) (Dr. Epstein presents a dynamic economic model for 
calculating patent infringement damages by applying price erosion to the market share rule). 
 72. See discussion supra Section II.A. 
 73. See discussion supra Section I.A.  This article briefly addressed the complexity in 
establishing a monetary value on intellectual property rights.  Because it is impossible to establish a 
precise value on intellectual property, it logically follows that damages from intellectual property 
infringement will be equally as difficult to value. 
 74. See Alpo Petfoods, Inc. v. Ralston Purina Co., 913 F.2d 958, 969 (D.C. Cir. 1990); 
Zatarains, Inc. v. Oak Grove Smokehouse, Inc., 698 F.2d 786, 795 (5th Cir. 1983). 
 75. 15 U.S.C. §1117(a) (2001). 
 76. MCCARTHY, supra note 70, at § 30:91.  It was anticipated the Supreme Court would 
finally clarify this provision in the summer of 2003.  However, the Court found no trademark 
infringement and thus avoided any discussion on treble or additional damages.  Dastar Corp. v. 
Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 123 S. Ct. 2041 (2003). 
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exceptional cases.77  An exceptional case warranting an award of 
attorney fees occurs when the trademark infringement is malicious, 
fraudulent, deliberate, or willful.78  These standards protect trademark 
owners from malicious infringement as well as protect innocent 
defendants from abusive owners.79  However, courts rarely award 
attorney’s fees to successful defendants.80  To win attorney’s fees, the 
prevailing party must demonstrate the exceptional nature of a case by 
clear and convincing evidence.81  Once the party makes this showing, the 
court may award attorney’s fees at its discretion.82 
Attorney’s fees are awarded in patent lawsuits similar to trademark 
lawsuits.  In addition to treble damages, the Patent Act provides that 
“[t]he court in exceptional cases may award reasonable attorney fees to 
the prevailing party.”83  While the Patent Act allows an award of 
reasonable attorney’s fees, such awards are relatively rare.84 
The Copyright Act allows statutory damages up to $150,000 per 
infringement for willful infringement.85  The court may, in its discretion, 
allow the recovery of full costs by or against any party other than the 
United States or an officer thereof.86  Unlike the other intellectual 
property statutes, the Copyright Act does not limit attorney’s fees 
awards to exceptional cases.87  Some courts award attorney’s fees to 
prevailing plaintiffs in copyright actions absent unusual circumstances.88  
However, a number of courts require prevailing plaintiffs to prove 
 
 77. 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (2001). 
 78. See United Phosphorus, Ltd. v. Midland Fumigant, Inc., 205 F.3d 1219, 1232 (10th Cir. 
2000); Seatrax, Inc. v. Sonbeck Int’l, Inc., 200 F.3d 358, 372-73 (5th Cir. 2000); Blockbuster 
Videos, Inc. v. City of Tempe, 141 F.3d 1295, 1300 (9th Cir. 1998). 
 79. MCCARTHY, supra note 70, at §§ 30:100-01. 
 80. See id. at § 30:101. 
 81. Pebble Beach Co. v. Tour 18 I Ltd., 155 F.3d 526, 555 (5th Cir. 1998).  See Christopher P. 
Bussert, Interpreting the “Exceptional Cases” Provision of Section 1117(a) of the Lanham Act: 
When an Award of Attorney’s Fees is Appropriate, 92 TRADEMARK REP. 1118 (2002) (providing an 
extensive analysis of attorney’s fees awards in trademark cases). 
 82. Pebble Beach, 155 F.3d. at 555. 
 83. LAURENCE H. PRETTY, PATENT LITIGATION § 9:11 (2001) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 285 
(2003)). 
 84. 3 JOHN GLADSTONE MILLS III, ET AL., PATENT LAW FUNDAMENTALS § 18:53 (2d ed. 
2003). 
 85. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (2000), declared unconstitutional by Columbia Pictures Television, 
Inc. v. Krypton Broad. of Birmingham, Inc., 259 F.3d. 1186, 1192 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that the 
Seventh Amendment requires a jury determination of the amount of statutory damages).  Congress 
is considering legislation to restore federal remedies for copyright infringement.  See S. 1191, 108th 
Cong. § 3 (2003); H.R. 2344, 108th Cong. § 3 (2003). 
 86. 17 U.S.C. § 505 (2000). 
 87. 2 ALBA CONTE, ATTORNEY FEE AWARDS § 17:6 (2d ed. 2003). 
 88. Id. 
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willful infringement or bad faith by the losing party.89  Alternatively, 
some courts award attorney’s fees to successful defendants in an attempt 
to deter frivolous and unreasonable lawsuits.90 
C.  Intangible Awards 
Generally, discussions of intellectual property damages end with 
monetary damages and injunctions.  Just as intellectual property is 
intangible, victories in intellectual property disputes yield intangible 
awards.  While these awards cannot be quantified, they confer benefits 
upon the intellectual property owner.  When the intellectual property 
owner wins the case, he wins legal precedent that strengthens protection 
of the IPA.  A written judicial opinion exists that establishes the validity 
and strength of the IPA.  The legal precedent grants the owner leverage 
against subsequent infringers.  As subsequent infringers emerge, the 
precedent conveys increased bargaining power to the owner.  Moreover, 
the precedent will likely cause subsequent infringers to shift from the 
adversarial commitment to the fundamental commitment and become 
more willing to enter licensing arrangements.  Additionally, publicity 
from the trial exposes the IPA to more consumers, many of whom may 
not have known about the IPA.  In essence, the trial provides advertising 
for the owner.  As a deterrent factor, publicity from the trial also grants 
the owner notoriety.  Subsequent infringers know the owner is willing to 
play hardball and fully litigate the dispute.  This notoriety will prevent 
some infringers from infringing altogether and persuade other infringers 
from attempting to bluff through litigation procedures. 
D.  The Perils of Uncertainty 
Understanding possible damages is imperative for both parties in 
intellectual property disputes.  Intellectual property cases do not present 
affirmative evidence of actual damages.  There are no medical bills or 
signed contracts.  There is no specificity.  Consider a typical personal 
injury case where the plaintiff suffers a broken leg.  The plaintiff has 
medical bills to prove the exact damages, and employment records will 
prove the exact amount of lost wages.  The plaintiff knows the exact 
 
 89. Id.  See Jeffrey Edward Barnes, Comment, Attorney’s Fee Awards in Federal Copyright 
Litigation After Fogerty v. Fantasy: Defendants are Winning Fees More Often, but the New 
Standard Still Favors Prevailing Plaintiffs, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1381, 1394-95 (2000) (providing a 
more detailed discussion of this issue). 
 90. David Moser, Sixth Circuit Generates Guidelines for Awarding Attorney Fees, ENT. L. & 
FIN. April 2002, at 3. 
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amount to claim, and the defendant knows the actual amount of potential 
liability.  The parties in intellectual property rarely have the benefit of 
written evidence to quantify damages.  The parties enter the battle 
unsure of the prize.  The most glowing example is the classic dispute 
over the slogan: “Gatorade is Thirst Aid for That Deep Down Body 
Thirst.” 
The Sands, Taylor & Wood Co. (Sands) registered several 
trademarks covering THIRST-AID and “First Aid for Your Thirst,” in 
the 1950s.91  In 1983, The Quaker Oats Co. (Quaker) acquired the 
manufacturer of Gatorade.92  Quaker immediately developed a new 
marketing campaign centered on the now famous “Gatorade is Thirst 
Aid for That Deep Down Body Thirst.”93  Quaker subsequently aired the 
first “Gatorade is Thirst Aid” commercials on television in 1984.94  
Sands filed suit for trademark infringement in 1984.95  Sands eventually 
won almost $43 million (inclusive of prejudgment interest and attorney’s 
fees), but the litigation spanned across six years with the final verdict 
entered in 1990.96  Quaker appealed and, in 1992, the Seventh Circuit 
vacated the prejudgment interest and remanded the case for recalculation 
utilizing a reasonable royalty rate.97  On this first remand, Federal 
District Court Judge Marshall entered a final award for Sands in the 
amount of $26.5 million; the year was 1993.98  However, Quaker 
appealed again, and the Seventh Circuit sharply criticized the remanded 
verdict.99  Consequently, the case was remanded in part again, and the 
appellate procedure consumed another year.100  Finally, in 1995, Judge 
Marshall entered the final verdict of nearly $27 million plus various pre-
judgment and post-judgment interest awards accruing from various 
dates.101 
In this dispute, the parties engaged in litigation for eleven years – 
six years from the complaint to the initial verdict plus five years of 
appeals.  Both parties watched the total damages range from $26 million 
to $43 million.  Judge Marshall and the Seventh Circuit disagreed at 
 
 91. Sands, Taylor & Wood Co. v. Quaker Oats Co., 978 F.2d 947, 949 (7th Cir. 1992). 
 92. Id. at 950. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. at 951. 
 96. See Sands, Taylor & Wood v. Quaker Oats Co., 1990 WL 251914, at 26 (N.D. Ill. 1990). 
 97. Sands, Taylor & Wood Co. v. Quaker Oats Co., 978 F.2d 947, 963 (7th Cir. 1992). 
 98. Sands, Taylor & Wood Co. v. Quaker Oats Co., 1993 WL 204092, at 8 (N.D. Ill. 1993). 
 99. Sands, Taylor & Wood v. Quaker Oats Co., 34 F.3d 1340, 1352-53 (7th Cir. 1994). 
 100. Id. 
 101. Sands, Taylor & Wood Co. v. Quaker Oats Co., 1995 WL 221871, at 3 (N.D. Ill. 1995). 
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some point on almost every component of damages – actual damages, 
treble damages, and attorney’s fees.  These discrepancies occurred 
because intellectual property law offers discretion and reasonableness 
factors rather than bright-line rules.  The absence of a concrete 
measurement of damages hinders courts equally or more severely than 
the parties.  Judges and juries must examine the parties’ arguments, sales 
records, marketing expenses, and past contracts with third parties to 
determine the proper damages in the dispute.  Even after this assessment, 
the factfinder must choose whether or not to award treble damages, 
statutory damages, or attorney’s fees.  The process yields a wide range 
of values in which the total damages award may fall. 
Admittedly, the Sands, Taylor case is the exception rather than the 
rule, and intellectual property law has become more sophisticated in 
calculating damages.  However, this case does illustrate a number of 
crucial points regarding damages for intellectual property cases.  First, 
without direct tangible evidence such as a contract or medical bills, the 
actual damages are impossible to calculate precisely.  Not only is this a 
problem for judges and juries, it imposes a similar burden on the parties.  
The owner cannot precisely calculate the economic loss inflicted upon 
the IPA.  Likewise, the infringer cannot exactly calculate his potential 
liability.  Second, intellectual property disputes are highly susceptible to 
appeals.  Intellectual property law is structured around reasonableness 
factors rather than bright-line rules.  Thus, the factfinder possesses a 
wide range of discretion when deciding the case.  Additionally, 
intellectual property disputes tend to yield lucrative damage awards.  
The combination of discretion to the factfinder and large damage awards 
provides losing parties with great incentives to appeal.  Third, 
intellectual property disputes easily can consume years in the appellate 
process.  The final verdict may prove economically unsatisfying to the 
winning party.  A successful infringer is especially susceptible to an 
extremely costly victory given the difficulty for a successful infringer to 
win attorney’s fees.  Faced with these elements, parties in intellectual 
property disputes have incentives to consider entering alternative dispute 
resolution in lieu of full-blown litigation. 
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III.  FORMS OF ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
ADR refers to procedures for settling disputes by means other than 
litigation.102  ADR primarily consists of two basic forms – arbitration 
and mediation.103  Parties may use arbitration, mediation, and other 
hybrid forms of dispute resolution to settle their disputes without 
proceeding through the trial process.104  In arbitration and mediation the 
parties submit the dispute to a neutral third party to resolve the 
disagreement.105  Both ADR forms present the twin benefits of more 
efficient resolution and lower costs than litigation.106  The parties are 
spared the lengthy processes of discovery and motion practice, which 
further enhances their cost savings.107  Furthermore, neither arbitrators 
nor the parties are bound to precedent like judges; they are free to utilize 
common sense when making their decisions.108  Also, the parties may 
select arbitrators and mediators with expertise in the field of the 
dispute.109 
Despite their similarities, several key differences exist between 
arbitration and mediation.  The most significant difference is the role of 
the conducting party.110  The arbitrator is a decision-maker, whereas the 
mediator plays the role of settlement-facilitator.111  Thus, arbitration 
more resembles a small trial than a negotiation,112 and arbitration retains 
the rigidity of litigation.113  Mediation provides the distinct advantage of 
allowing the parties to design their own resolution by means of a 
 
 102. Adam Epstein, Alternative Dispute Resolution in Sport Management and the Sport 
Management Curriculum, 12 J. LEGAL ASPECTS SPORT 153, 154 (2002). 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Tom Grant, Turkey Embraces Arbitration as Step Toward Global Economic Integration, 
74 N.Y. ST. B.J. 46, 47 (2002); Peter K. Yu, Toward a Nonzero-Sum Approach to Resolving Global 
Intellectual Property Disputes: What We Can Learn From Mediators, Business Strategists, and 
International Relations Theorists, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 569, 589 (2002). 
 106. Joshua R. Welsh, Comment, Has Expansion of the Federal Arbitration Act Gone Too 
Far?: Enforcing Arbitration Clauses in Void Ab Initio Contracts, 86 MARQ. L. REV. 581, 582 
(2002). 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Robert L. Ebe, The Nuts and Bolts of Arbitration, 22 FRANCHISE L.J. 85, 86-87 (2002).  
See http://www.ilnd.uscourts.gov/legal/wdadr/ (last visited 10/25/03) (listing available mediators by 
their respective areas of expertise for the parties to choose). 
 110. Epstein, supra note 102, at 154. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Hayden R. Brainard, Survey and Study of Technology Development and Transfer Needs in 
New York, 9 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 423, 445 (1999). 
 113. Id. 
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mutually agreed-upon solution.114  The mediator serves as a translator, 
guiding the parties to reach an agreement.115  The mediator expands the 
parties’ available resources by providing an understanding of the 
complicated issues at hand as well as an unemotional analysis of the 
underlying problem.116  Mediation deflects the focus of the dispute away 
from rights, winners, and losers.117  Instead, mediation focuses on the 
parties’ interests and mutual gains.118  As a result, mediation gives the 
parties an opportunity to reinforce their relationships with one 
another.119  Parties in mediation may strengthen relationships of trust and 
respect or terminate the relationship altogether in a manner that 
minimizes mental anguish as well as monetary costs.120 
Mediation serves as the predominantly beneficial form of ADR for 
intellectual property disputes.  In Section I, this article presented the 
fundamental and adversarial interests governing intellectual property 
disputes.  The true nature of intellectual property disputes lies in each 
party’s interest commitment.  Because mediation focuses on the parties’ 
interests, it is best tailored to handle intellectual property disputes.121  
Mediation focuses on each party’s interest commitment to assist the 
parties in creating a mutually beneficial agreement.122  Stated differently, 
mediation focuses on the parties’ interests to resolve the dispute rather 
than declare a winner.123  Mediation thus overcomes the shortfalls of 
arbitration.  Mediation allows the parties to design a mutually beneficial 
solution, whereas arbitration only provides a more efficient means of 
declaring a winner.124  Mediation provides a platform where both the 
owner and infringer may satisfy their interest commitment to some 
extent.  While mediation better serves intellectual property disputes, it is 
necessary to analyze a hybrid form of mediation and arbitration. 
 
 114. HOWARD C. ANAWALT & ELIZABETH E. POWERS, IP STRATEGY: COMPLETE 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PLANNING, ACCESS AND PROTECTION § 5:26 (2003). 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Danny Ciraco, Forget the Mechanics and Bring in the Gardeners, 9 U. BALT. INTELL. 
PROP. L.J. 47, 60 (2000). 
 118. Id. 
 119. Kathy L. Cerminara, Contextualizing ADR in Managed Care: A Proposal Aimed at 
Easing Tensions and Resolving Conflict, 33 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 547, 557 (2002). 
 120. Id. 
 121. But see discussion infra Section V for the interrelation of mediation, arb-med, and 
arbitration for each of the nine scenarios. 
 122. See Ciraco, supra note 117, at 60. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. at 63. 
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A.  Arb-Med/Med-Arb 
Mediation-Arbitration (med-arb) is a hybrid form of mediation and 
arbitration.125  Parties most often use med-arb when the dispute is 
complex and involves numerous issues.126  Under med-arb, the parties 
attempt to resolve the dispute first during a mediation phase.127  After 
mediation, the parties submit unresolved issues to arbitration.128  
Sometimes the mediator also serves as the arbitrator, but this dual role is 
often unwise for obvious reasons.129  Arb-med is the same hybrid as 
med-arb, but arbitration precedes mediation.130  In arb-med, the parties 
first enter a conventional arbitration.131  The arbitrator renders a 
decision, but the decision is placed in a sealed envelope.132  Neither 
party knows the substance of the decision, only that a decision has been 
made.133  Then the parties proceed to a conventional mediation.134  If the 
parties resolve the dispute in mediation, the resolution ends the matter.135  
If a superceded arbitration decision is disclosed after the mediation, one 
of the parties may become frustrated.136  However, the parties have the 
contractual power to specify disclosure of the decision prior to 
mediation.137  If the parties fail to reach an agreement in the mediation, 
the initial arbitration award decides the dispute.138 
Arb-med and med-arb are both recognized forms of ADR.  
However, med-arb possesses a striking weakness that does not foster 
agreement.  The major point of mediation is to foster communication 
between the parties so they can reach an agreement.  In med-arb, a 
binding arbitration will follow the mediation if the parties fail to reach 
an agreement.139  Therefore, the parties will likely hold back vital 
 
 125. Epstein, supra note 102, at 160. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Stephen K. Huber, The Role of Arbitrator: Conflicts of Interest, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 
915, 929 (2001). 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id.  Sometimes, the neutral party begins working with the parties as a mediator but at 
some point becomes an arbitrator.  This model is much weaker for a number of reasons, primarily 
due to the arbitrary transition from an arbitration to a mediation.  See Cerminara, supra note 119, at 
561. 
 135. Huber, supra note 131, at 929. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. 
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information during the mediation in case the dispute goes to arbitration.  
In mediation, the parties are free to walk away for any reason.  Med-arb 
deprives the parties of this freedom.  Parties willing to freely talk in a 
true mediation will take a more conservative approach than during the 
mediation phase of a med-arb.  The threat of entering a subsequent 
arbitration prevents the parties from openly seeking a solution.  The 
subsequent arbitration hinders the mediation from providing an 
agreement.  Parties who would reach an agreement in a true mediation 
may reach an impasse during the mediation phase of med-arb. 
Arb-med deprives the parties of the freedom to freely walk away 
but generates the opposite result.  The parties first fight out the dispute in 
arbitration.  The decision is entered, and nothing will change it.  In the 
mediation phase, the parties may talk freely.  They can try to work out 
an agreement or gamble that the arbitration decision is favorable.  Parties 
willing to talk freely in a true mediation will take the same approach 
during the mediation phase of arb-med.  But, parties unwilling to talk 
freely in a true mediation now have a greater incentive to do so in the 
mediation phase of arb-med.  With an arbitration decision already 
entered, the parties have nothing to lose by trying to reach an agreement.  
Consequently, arb-med fosters agreement between the parties better than 
med-arb. 
B.  The Alternative Dispute Resolution Act 
In 1998, Congress enacted the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act 
(ADRA).140  The ADRA requires each federal district court to 
implement an ADR program and specifically authorizes courts to 
compel civil litigants into mediation.141  The ADRA allows the district 
courts substantial flexibility and discretion in designing their ADR 
programs.142  Courts have the ability to determine the extent of the 
program, what ADR forms to use, and what disputes are subject to the 
program.143  Along with the ADRA, a variety of public and private 
forces have attempted to nudge civil litigants into ADR procedures in 
the early stages of their lawsuits.144  Mandatory ADR programs force 
civil litigants to make serious choices about settlement early in their 
 
 140. Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1988, 28 U.S.C. § 651 (2000).  See Holly A. 
Streeter-Schaefer, Notes, A Look at Court Mandated Civil Mediation, 49 DRAKE L. REV. 367, 372 
(2001). 
 141. Mark R. Anderson, Settle or Roll the Dice?, 28 LITIG. 37, 39 (2001). 
 142. Streeter-Schaefer, supra note 140, at 373. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Anderson, supra note 141, at 38. 
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lawsuits.145  The logic behind this initiative is straightforward: when the 
parties seek settlement before incurring large litigation costs, they are 
more likely to work out an agreement than war-torn, ego-bruised 
litigants.146 
In 1996, the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois 
implemented The Lanham Act Mediation Program (Program).147  The 
Program was specifically designed to provide mediation services for 
trademark disputes.148  Under the Program, all cases are assigned to the 
Program, but individual parties may choose whether or not to 
participate.149  The response from the Program was overwhelming; most 
participating lawyers rated the Program exceptionally high and stated 
they would use the Program again.  The Program has effectively 
achieved a 65-72 percent resolution rate of all disputes submitted to 
mediation.150  This figure warrants mentioning again: in two-thirds of all 
disputes submitted to mediation, the parties reached an agreement.151 
The Program serves as the best evidence of mediation’s strength in 
fostering mutual agreements in intellectual property disputes.152  If 
mediation can provide agreements in roughly two-thirds of all submitted 
disputes, parties should consider submitting the dispute to mediation 
rather than litigation. 
IV.  THE ADVANTAGES/RISKS CALCULUS FOR INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY DISPUTES 
Parties in intellectual property disputes must base their decisions to 
litigate or mediate upon the advantages/risks calculus between the two 
options.  The calculus is complex, and an exhaustive documentation 
would span across numerous volumes of text.  This article will discuss 
some of the major advantages and risks of litigation153 as well as the 
 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id.  The American Intellectual Property Law Association is following the trend of 
promoting ADR in intellectual property disputes.  See http://www.aipla.org/committees/reports/pdf_ 
rpts/adr.pdf (last visited 10/25/03). 
 147. Jennifer Shack & Susan M. Yates, Mediating Lanham Act Cases: The Role of Empirical 
Evaluation, 22 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 287, 288 (2002).  For more information on the Program, see 
http://www.ilnd.uscourts.gov/legal/wdadr/ (last visited 10/25/02). 
 148. Shack & Yates, supra note 147, at 288. 
 149. Id. at 289. 
 150. Id. at 300. 
 151. Id. 
 152. But see discussion infra Section V for the interrelation of mediation, arb-med, and 
arbitration for each of the nine scenarios. 
 153. While it is understood “litigation” encompasses motion practice and ADR procedures, 
“litigation” in this article will refer to the parties proceeding to trial. 
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advantages and risks of mediation.154  While the calculus is not an exact 
science, it is a substantive evaluation that intellectual property owners 
and infringers must consider.  Attorneys must be ready to accurately 
evaluate the client’s advantages/risks calculus to decide the appropriate 
tactics in resolving the dispute.155  Any serious pursuit of mediation 
presents a question of risk management.156  The lawyer best serves the 
client by strategically analyzing the advantages/risks calculus and by 
providing complete information and options.157  Consequently, the 
lawyer must analyze the calculus the moment a dispute arises.158  
Intellectual property disputes impose great expense on the parties 
through burdensome discovery processes, particularly in high-tech 
disputes.159  Additionally, intellectual property disputes are often 
incredibly time sensitive.160  Moreover, intellectual property disputes 
often consist of complex facts and involve a significant degree of 
technical know-how.161  Delay in evaluating the calculus may prove 
costly. 
A.  Advantages/Risks Calculus for Intellectual Property Owners 
Intellectual property owners must examine the calculus along with 
their interest commitment and potential damage awards in the particular 
dispute.  While the calculus is necessary to evaluate the decision to 
litigate or mediate, the calculus will provide no definitive answers.  It is 
not an equation where the owner can plug in a set of values and receive a 
yes or no decision.  But, the attorney and owner working together should 
be able to formulate an effective strategy based on the advantages and 
risks of proceeding to litigation or mediation. 
1.  The Advantages of Litigation 
Litigation offers the intellectual property owner several advantages 
over ADR.  First, the owner may potentially win the full damages sought 
 
 154. While this article focuses on mediation, the true calculus would apply to all forms of 
ADR. 
 155. Anderson, supra note 141, at 39. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Miles J. Alexander, Settlement of Intellectual Property Disputes: When is it Better to 
Switch than Fight?, ALI-ABA COURSE MATERIALS J., Nov. 1992, at 1, 3. 
 159. Ciraco, supra note 117, at 52. 
 160. Id.  Patent disputes and technological copyright disputes are especially susceptible to time 
limitations given the short duration of patent rights and the rapid advance of technology. 
 161. Id. 
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in the complaint.  Second, in addition to full damages, the intellectual 
property owner may win treble or statutory damages as well as 
attorney’s fees for the dispute.  Third, a victory at trial will strengthen 
protection of the IPA.  Fourth, the intellectual property owner will have 
a written statement detailing the reasons for his victory.  Finally, a 
victory at trial will establish legal precedent for future disputes. 
2.  The Risks of Litigation 
Despite its large potential rewards, litigation imposes a number of 
significant risks on the owner.  One of the major issues facing 
intellectual property owners is the cost of enforcing their intellectual 
property rights.162  Intellectual property litigation typically spans several 
years with total costs commonly exceeding hundreds of thousands or 
even millions of dollars.163  A 2001 survey of the American Intellectual 
Property Law Association (AIPLA) calculated the average cost through 
trial of typical patent disputes (those disputes between $1 and $25 
million at risk) at $1,499,000; $699,000 for similar trade secret disputes; 
$502,000 for trademark disputes; and $400,000 for copyright disputes.164  
The highly competitive nature of litigation encourages the parties to 
exaggerate their claims and thus drive up the costs of litigation.165  These 
exaggerated positions ignite the costs of seeking the “truth” when both 
parties have expanded the bounds of the dispute.166  Additionally, the 
court system establishes a great quantum of merit upon evidentiary 
procedure, witness credibility, and burdens of proof.167  The result is a 
painstaking process surrounded by opportunities for delay.168  With the 
exorbitant costs and huge potential damages in intellectual property 
cases, the losing party often appeals, which further adds to the costs and 
duration of the dispute.169 
 
 162. Stephen Y. Chow, Strategic Alliances: Intellectual Property, 1063 PRACTISING L. INST.: 
CORP. L. & PRAC. COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 273, 285 (1998). 
 163. Ciraco, supra note 117, at 68. 
 164. FETZER-KRAUS, INC., AIPLA REPORT OF ECONOMIC SURVEY 2001 84-90 (2001) (noting 
that when more than $25 million dollars is at risk, the average litigation costs reach $2.99 million 
for patent disputes, $1.00 million for trademark disputes, $750 thousand for copyright disputes, and 
$1.01 million for trade secret disputes.  See Maurice A. Garbell, Inc. v. Boeing Co., 546 F.2d 297, 
301 (9th Cir. 1976) (allowing attorney’s fees of $237,062.50 for 18,525 hours spread out over 10 
years of litigation). 
 165. Ciraco, supra note 117, at 68. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. at 69. 
 168. Id. 
 169. See Sands, Taylor & Wood Co. v. Quaker Oats Co., 978 F.2d 947, 949 (7th Cir. 1992).  
The last sentence of the opening paragraph of the opinion reads, “Not surprisingly, Quaker appeals,” 
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While over 90 percent of cases do not proceed to trial,170 parties 
still incur substantial costs from the time of filing the claim through 
discovery.171  These costs diminish the value of 11th hour settlements.172  
Clearly, parties gain more value from settlements early in the litigation 
than from 11th hour settlements where the parties have already incurred 
substantial litigation expenses.173  Even a high settlement agreement on 
the eve of trial may confer less economic value to the owner than a 
lesser settlement earlier in the litigation process.174  With these factors, 
litigation may offer a bittersweet victory, even for successful litigants.175  
Proceeding to trial is a huge gamble.176  “This realization is driven home 
when you are waiting for the jury to return a verdict or a judge to 
announce a decision.  At that moment, it is crystal clear the outcome can 
go either way and you might lose.”177  Once the judge or jury has 
deliberated to make the decision, the owner truly realizes his lack of say 
in the final decision.178  While facing these perils of litigation, owners 
must evaluate the option of submitting the dispute to mediation. 
3.  The Advantages of Mediation 
The mediation process is designed to alleviate the massive risks 
associated with litigation.  Mediation offers substantial cost savings over 
litigation.179  Mediation often saves about eighty percent of the total 
costs of litigation.180  Litigation grants an advantage to parties with 
significant financial resources, but mediation allows parties of lesser 
financial means an equal opportunity to effectively voice their 
 
after the district court found Quaker liable for nearly $43 million, including prejudgment interest 
and attorney’s fees.  Id. 
 170. Alexander, supra note 158, at 9. 
 171. See generally FETZER-KRAUS, supra note 164. 
 172. Anderson, supra note 141, at 39-40. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. at 40. 
 175. Janet Stidman Eveleth, Settling Disputes Without Litigation, 34 MD. B.J. 2, 8 (2001). 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id.  Ms. Eveleth quotes the Honorable Howard S. Chasanow, recently of the Court of 
Appeals of Maryland.  Ms. Eveleth offers no citation; it is assumed Judge Chasanow’s comments 
came from informal conversation. 
 178. See id. 
 179. Ciraco, supra note 117, at 70.  One prominent attorney involved in a multi-defendant 
securities fraud claim negotiated a settlement for his client.  The other defendants remained in the 
litigation before reaching a final judgment ten years later.  The decision to settle spared the client 
ten years of litigation as well as fees.  While this scenario involved a settlement, mediation would 
have achieved a similar result.  Anderson, supra note 141, at 38.  See Peter H. Kaskell, Is Your 
Infringement Dispute Suitable for Mediation?, 20 ALTERNATIVES 45, 58 (2002). 
 180. Ciraco, supra note 117, at 70. 
26
Akron Law Review, Vol. 37 [2004], Iss. 2, Art. 7
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol37/iss2/7
LEMLEY1.DOC 4/5/2004  11:22 AM 
2004] ADR IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY DISPUTES 313 
positions.181  Judge Chasanow commented on the benefits of mediation, 
“We saved three to five years in time; $100,000s in dollars saved, and 
untold emotions by resolving it in this manner.”182  The cost savings are 
not limited to financial savings. 
Mediation also saves the parties intangible costs.  In a trial, the 
parties must relive the damaging acts that brought them to trial.183  While 
intellectual property plaintiffs do not have a physical tragedy to relive, 
mediation does spare them the mental anguish and suffering of an 
arduous litigation process.184  Tom Monaghan, the former owner of 
Domino’s Pizza, once described the litigation experience as Chinese 
water torture.185  After eventually winning the case, Mr. Monaghan 
commented, “I cried like I’d never cried before in my life.”186  Along 
with the mental anguish, intellectual property disputes utilize a 
painstaking discovery process.187  The discovery process forces the 
parties to suffer intangible losses in the form of lost time.188  The parties 
themselves, as well as key employees, often spend hours in depositions; 
the lost time can never be recovered.189 
While litigation can consume years, mediation often provides a 
resolution within a few hours or days.190  Patent disputes in particular 
embrace a paramount importance on time.191  Otherwise, due to 
technological advances, the patent may become invalid even before 
resolution of the dispute.192  While trademark, copyright, and trade secret 
disputes lack this resolve-before-it-is-obsolete element, there is still a 
need for a speedy resolution.193  Intellectual property disputes demand 
 
 181. Id.  See Eveleth, supra note 175, at 3 (giving the following example: in the summer of 
2000, a personal injury case settled for $2.6 million even though the plaintiff never filed a lawsuit). 
 182. Eveleth, supra note 175, at 9. 
 183. Id. 
 184. Emotional distress is a recognized injury where aggrieved parties may recover monetary 
damages in tort.  PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 12 (W. Page Keeton et al. eds, 
West 5th ed. 1984).  While this article is not suggesting parties should be able to recover damages 
for going through litigation, parties must give serious consideration to the mental anguish involved 
in the litigation process. 
 185. Alexander, supra note 158, at 6. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Ciraco, supra note 117, at 69. 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Carmen Collar Fernandez & Jerry Spolter, International Intellectual Property Dispute 
Resolution: Is Mediation a Sleeping Giant?, 53 DISP. RESOL. J. 62, 63 (1998).  Furthermore, the 
party seeking mediation early in the dispute shows strength rather than weakness.  The party with 
the weaker case has the harder time in mediation.  Anderson, supra note 141, at 39. 
 191. Ciraco, supra note 117, at 52. 
 192. Id. 
 193. See Fernandez & Spolter, supra note 190, at 63. 
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swift resolution so the parties can focus their energies back on making 
money rather than financing litigation.194  However, swift resolution 
cannot come at the sacrifice of confidentiality.195  Confidentiality is 
often crucial in intellectual property disputes.196  Mediation guarantees 
the parties privacy and confidentiality.197  Arguably, confidentiality is 
the most important advantage mediation offers.198  Confidentiality plays 
an even more important role in trade secret disputes where the value of 
the trade secret derives from the secrecy of the IPA.199  Not surprisingly, 
confidentiality is probably the most frequently discussed issue in 
mediation.200  Along with confidentiality, the parties in intellectual 
property disputes seek expertise in the factfinder to deal with complex 
issues.201  Mediation offers this expertise by the mediator, expertise that 
juries and judges often lack.202  By providing the necessary expertise, 
mediation saves the parties additional time and effort, as well as 
providing more equitable results.203 
4.  The Risks of Mediation 
Mediation does present its own set of disadvantages for the 
intellectual property owner. First, the negotiated settlement will likely 
fall short of a possible trial award.  Second, mediation eliminates the 
chances of winning treble/statutory damages or attorney’s fees.  Third, 
there is an uncertainty as to when to mediate (as opposed to trial which 
sets out a schedule).  Finally, there is no way to impeach parties at trial 
with false statements made in mediation.204  In other words, the 
 
 194. Id. 
 195. See Mills, supra note 55, at 227. 
 196. Id. at 231. 
 197. Christine Lepera & Jeannie Costello, Benefits of Mediating Intellectual Property and 
Entertainment-Related Disputes, 605 PRACTISING L. INST.: LITIG. & ADMIN. PRAC. COURSE 
HANDBOOK SERIES 621, 623 (1999). 
 198. Kaskell, supra note 179, at 60. 
 199. Nancy Neal Yeend & Cathy E. Rincon, ADR and Intellectual Property: A Prudent 
Option, 36 IDEA 601, 605 (1996). 
 200. Joseph A. Torregrossa, Appellate Mediation in the Third Circuit–Program Operations: 
Nuts, Bolts and Practice Tips, 47 VILL. L. REV. 1059, 1075 (2002). 
 201. Brainard, supra note 112, at 449. 
 202. Id. at 450.  See generally LeRoy L. Kondo, Untangling the Tangled Web: Federal Court 
Reform Through Specialization for Internet Law and Other High Technology Cases, 2002 UCLA 
J.L. & TECH. 1 (discussing the difficulty facing judges and juries to understand technical 
complexities in internet and high technology cases). 
 203. Mills, supra note 57, at 227-28. 
 204. Lynne H. Rambo, Impeaching Lying Parties with Their Statements During Negotiation: 
Demysticizing the Public Policy Rationale Behind Evidence Rule 408 and the Mediation-Privilege 
Statutes, 75 WASH. L. REV. 1037, 1044-1045 (2000). 
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intellectual property owner may rely on false information in the 
mediation.205 
With these considerations, the intellectual property owner’s 
calculus takes form.  The calculus consists of four components, the 
advantages and disadvantages of both proceeding to trial and pursuing 
mediation.  The advantages of proceeding to trial are: 
 
(1) Possibility of winning full damages, 
(2) Possibility of winning treble/statutory damages, 
(3) Possibility of winning attorney’s fees, 
(4) Strengthen the IPA, 
(5) Establish legal precedent, and 
(6) Intangible awards. 
 
Conversely, the disadvantages of proceeding to trial are: 
 
(1) Possibility of an outright loss, 
(2) Weaken or invalidate the IPA, 
(3) Insufficient damages award, 
(4) Long trial, 
(5) Long appellate process, 
(6) Possibility of not winning (or not qualifying for) treble/statutory 
damages, 
(7) Possibility of not winning (or not qualifying for) attorney’s fees, 
(8) Mental anguish/suffering, 
(9) No voice in the final decision, 
(10) Massive litigation costs, 
(11) 11th hour settlements, 
(12) Intangible losses, 
(13) Probably eliminates future relationships, 
(14) Issues turn on credibility of witnesses, 
(15) Decision-maker lacks technical expertise, and 
(16) Bad publicity. 
 
Whereas, the advantages of mediation are: 
 
(1) Have a voice in the final solution, 
(2) Cost beneficial, 
(3) Avoid 11th hour settlements, 
 
 205. Id. 
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(4) Work with the opposing party to establish a licensing fee, 
(5) Guaranteed to strengthen the IPA, 
(6) Minimize intangible losses, 
(7) Minimize mental anguish/suffering, 
(8) Time sensitive, 
(9) Promote future relationships (if desired), 
(10) Issues do not turn on witness credibility, 
(11) Technical expertise in decision-makers, and 
(12) Confidentiality of the final agreement. 
 
Finally, the disadvantages of mediation are: 
 
(1) Uncertainty as to when to mediate, 
(2) No treble/statutory damages, 
(3) No attorney’s fees, 
(4) Licensing fee may not be as high as trial award, 
(5) Cannot use statements made in mediation to impeach the 
opposing party at trial, and 
(6) Cannot discover damaging evidence from the infringer through 
discovery. 
 
As mentioned before, this representation of the advantages/risks 
calculus is not exhaustive (an exhaustive list is not feasible).  As a 
further aside, the quantification of each factor will differ depending on 
the owner and the facts of the case.  For example, mental 
anguish/suffering will weigh significantly in an individual owner’s 
decision.  The saved time and trouble of mediation may prove enough 
for the individual owner to forego any intention of proceeding to trial.  
Stated differently, mental anguish/suffering alone may be sufficient to 
shift the individual owner from OA to O or from O to OF.  Conversely, 
bad publicity is often of no concern to the individual owner.  For a large 
corporation suing to protect its intellectual property, mental 
anguish/suffering will prove a negligible factor.  However, bad publicity 
will weigh significantly and may be enough on its own merits for the 
corporation not to proceed to trial; that is, the pressure of bad publicity 
may cause the corporation to shift its interest commitment. 
Owners must also apply the calculus to the value of each IPA as 
well as the owner’s available complementary factors to realize such 
value.  An intellectual property owner with massive marketing, 
production, and distribution resources may place greater emphasis on the 
advantages of litigation.  Such an owner can fully realize the economic 
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value of the IPA without outsourcing vital business components.  An 
owner without these resources may look wholly to the advantages of 
mediation to seek means of realizing the IPA’s full economic value.  
Complete application of the calculus demands numerous considerations 
for the owner in evaluating whether to litigate or mediate.  The calculus 
is equally complex for infringers. 
B.  Advantages/Risks Calculus for Intellectual Property Infringers 
Intellectual property infringers face a similar calculus as IP owners.  
Infringers are presented with the same potential windfalls and perils as 
owners.  The calculus is the same, with some minor variances.  For 
instance, damages awards in intellectual property cases function as 
advantages for owners but serve as liabilities for infringers.  The 
substance of the considerations is largely equivocal, and a repeat of the 
analysis is not necessary. The advantages of trial for the infringer are: 
 
(1) Potentially win the right to profit from the IPA free of charge, 
(2) Potentially diminish the value of or invalidate the IPA, 
(3) Potentially establish a fair use provision, 
(4) Establish legal precedent, and 
(5) Written rationale for the final decision. 
 
The risks of trial for the infringer are: 
 
(1) Possibility of excessive trial court award to the owner, 
(2) Possibility of paying treble/statutory damages, 
(3) Possibility of paying the owner’s attorney’s fees,206 
(4) Massive litigation costs, 
(5) Possibility of losing the right to profit from the IPA, 
(6) Mental anguish/suffering, 
(7) Long trial, 
(8) Long appellate process, 
(9) No voice in final decision, 
(10) Intangible losses, 
(11) Probably eliminates future relationships, 
(12) 11th hour settlements, 
(13) Issues turn on witness credibility, and 
 
 206. See supra Section II.  If the unsuccessful infringer is forced to pay the owner’s attorney’s 
fees, the infringer is essentially forced to pay twice for a losing case.  The liable infringer may have 
to pay its own costs as well as the owner’s costs. 
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(14) Decision-maker lacks technical expertise. 
 
The advantages of mediation for the infringer are: 
 
(1) Guaranteed right to future profits from the IPA, 
(2) Have a voice in the final solution, 
(3) Cost beneficial, 
(4) Eliminates possibility of paying treble/statutory damages, 
(5) Eliminates possibility of paying owner’s attorney’s fees, 
(6) Avoid 11th hour settlements, 
(7) Time sensitive, 
(8) Minimize mental anguish/suffering, 
(9) Minimize intangible losses, and 
(10) Promote ongoing relationship (if desired). 
 
The risks of mediation for the infringer are: 
 
(1) Eliminates free use, 
(2) Lose opportunity to invalidate or weaken the IPA, and 
(3) Negotiated licensing fee may exceed trial court award (but, if a 
royalty rate is awarded at trial, the infringer loses the right to future 
use). 
 
Like the intellectual property owner, the advantages/risks calculus 
for the intellectual property infringer is not an exact science.  The 
quantification of each factor will differ depending on the infringer and 
the particularities of the dispute.  To add an additional complication, the 
owner and the infringer may easily be forced to apply both calculi in the 
same dispute.  Consider two patentees both claiming infringement of 
their respective patents.  The plaintiff must apply the owner calculus 
toward his claim, but he must also apply the infringer calculus as the 
counterdefendant.  The reverse is true for the defendant, for he assumes 
the role of owner in the counterclaim. 
C.  Analyzing the Calculus Against the Nine Scenarios 
An examination of the owner and infringer calculus reveals a 
commonality between the owner and the infringer: each party most often 
favors mediation over trial.  In each calculus, the advantages of 
mediation and the risks of litigation are the strongest components.  In 
other words, the parties’ interests are most often aligned, at least to the 
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extent of whether to litigate or mediate.  Of course, regardless of the 
parties’ preference for mediation, the mediation cannot succeed unless 
the parties share other common interests.  In Section I, this article 
presented the fundamental and adversarial interests as well as the nine 
possible scenarios in intellectual property disputes.  For illustrative 
purposes, the nine scenarios are represented here in tabular form: 
 
Parties Group 
1.  OF + NF A 
2.  OF + N A 
3.  O + NF A 
4.  O + N A 
5.  OF + NA B 
6.  OA + NF B 
7.  OA + N B 
8.  O + NA B 
9.  OA + NA C 
 
The nine scenarios illustrate a dynamic feature concerning 
intellectual property disputes: the parties’ interests most often align.  In 
Group A disputes, the parties’ interests are aligned before any 
negotiation or mediation takes place.  The owner is willing to allow use 
for payment, and the infringer is willing to pay for use.  Stated 
differently, both parties are willing to enter a licensing agreement 
concerning the IPA.  In Group B disputes, only one of the parties is 
unwilling to enter a licensing agreement before entering negotiation or 
mediation.  After mediation commences, all that is needed for an 
agreement is for the unwilling party to shift from the adversarial interest 
to the hybrid.  Through reality testing and other mediation techniques, 
this shift will likely occur.207 
An analysis of each party’s calculus combined with an analysis of 
the nine scenarios demonstrates two crucial points in evaluating 
intellectual property disputes.  First, each party’s calculus suggests 
mediation rather than litigation for most disputes.  Second, the nine 
scenarios illustrate that in eight scenarios the parties’ interests align or 
are likely to align.  This alignment is crucial for mediation to succeed, 
 
 207. Reality testing includes consideration of the best and worst alternatives to a negotiated 
agreement as well as making both parties objectively analyze their proposed solutions.  See MARK 
D. BENNETT & MICHELE S.G. HERMANN, THE ART OF MEDIATION 63 (1996).  This intriguing work 
provides a step-by-step analysis of all the necessary components of a successful mediation. 
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and it exists in intellectual property disputes.  The parties prefer 
mediation, and this mutual preference combines with the requisite 
interest alignment or with a strong likelihood of interest alignment.  
Intellectual property disputes are thus prime candidates for an ADR 
program centered on mediation. 
V.  THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROPOSAL 
The ultimate goal of this article is to propose a sophisticated dispute 
resolution program for intellectual property disputes (Proposal).  The 
Proposal will provide a means for efficiently resolving intellectual 
property disputes through trial or ADR.  Using the concepts of the 
fundamental and adversarial interests, the Proposal will design proper 
dispute resolution platforms for particular disputes.  The Proposal 
centers on the nine scenarios in intellectual property disputes.  For each 
scenario, a particular form of dispute resolution will best serve the needs 
of the parties.  Using the nine scenarios and knowledge of dispute 
resolution methods, the Proposal manifests the following chart: 
 







1.  OF + NF A Excellent ADR Mediation 
2.  OF + N A Excellent ADR Mediation 
3.  O + NF A Excellent ADR Mediation 
4.  O + N A Excellent ADR Mediation 
5.  OF + NA B Very Good ADR Arb-Med 
6.  OA + NF B Very Good ADR Arb-Med 
7.  OA + N B Good ADR Arb-Med 
8.  O + NA B Good ADR Arb-Med 
9.  OA + NA C Poor Trial Trial or Arbitration 
 
The likelihood of agreement column derives statistical confirmation 
from the Lanham Act Mediation Program (Program).208  The Program 
generated agreements in two-thirds of all mediated disputes.  The chart 
lists a “Very Good” or better rating for two-thirds of the disputes and 
 
 208. See supra Section III.  The author realizes one correlation does not establish statistical 
certainty, but the correlation of the chart’s projections with the Program’s results shows the chart 
was not generated in a completely arbitrary fashion.  The hypotheses presented in this article are 
substantiated to some degree by the Program’s results. 
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coincides with the results of the Program. 
Utilizing the chart, the Proposal will submit each dispute to trial or 
an appropriate form of alternative dispute resolution.  Each dispute will 
be discussed in turn in the following subsections.  But first, it is 
important to address the issue of forcing parties to submit to binding 
ADR.  While there is some authority to force parties to enter non-
binding ADR,209 no authority exists to force parties to enter binding 
ADR.210  Despite the arguments against forced ADR, compulsory 
mediations from contractual provisions enjoy success rates as high as 50 
percent.211  Nonetheless, like the Lanham Act Mediation Program, the 
parties must first agree to enter the Proposal before the Proposal can take 
effect. 
A.  Group A Disputes 
In this group, the chances of an effective mediation are excellent.  
Within the possible scenarios in this group, both parties are either 
committed to the fundamental interest or a hybrid where the fundamental 
and adversarial interests are somewhat equal.  The key component is that 
neither party is committed to the adversarial interest.  The owner is 
readily willing to allow use for payment or may be readily convinced to 
allow use for payment.  The infringer is readily willing to pay for use or 
may be readily convinced to pay for use.  The parties’ interest 
commitments are aligned, and mediation will almost certainly yield a 
mutual agreement.  Consequently, the Proposal adopts a sophisticated 
form of mandatory mediation.  The mediation is mandatory, but it is 
only imposed in Group A disputes where both parties are willing to enter 
a licensing agreement. Thus, the Proposal resolves the debate of whether 
or not to use mandatory mediation.  The Proposal only uses mandatory 
mediation for disputes where both parties are willing to enter a licensing 
agreement. 
 
 209. In Texas, the court may force the parties in a pending dispute to ADR.  TEX. CIV. PRAC. 
& REM. CODE ANN. § 154.021(a) (Vernon 1987).  See Walton v. Canon, Short & Gaston, 23 
S.W.3d 143, 150 (Tex. App. 2000).  Although the court can exercise this right against the parties’ 
will, the court may not force the parties to reach an agreement.  Decker v. Lindsay, 824 S.W.2d 247, 
251 (Tex. App. 1992). 
 210. In some fundamental disputes, the right to have a trial is so imperative that courts refuse 
to enforce mandatory arbitration clauses, much less impose court-ordered ADR.  Reginald B. 
Henderson, Pre-Dispute Mandatory Arbitration Agreements and ERISA Fiduciary Claims: The 
Courts Unfortunately Declare them a Perfect Match, 26 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 27, 33-35 (2002). 
 211. Diane H. Banks, Paths to Mediation, with Sample Clauses, 14 UTAH B.J. 26 (2001). 
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B.  Group B Disputes 
In this group, one party is committed to the adversarial interest.  
However, mediation is still likely to yield an agreement between the 
parties.  If during the course of the mediation the party committed to the 
adversarial interest shifts to the hybrid, a settlement will likely result.  
Since the point of mediation is to facilitate such a shift, the odds are 
good this shift will occur.  When the other party is committed to the 
fundamental interest, the odds of settlement are slightly higher, thus 
justifying the “Very Good” versus the “Good” ratings.  The Proposal 
subjects these parties to arb-med, which invokes a hybrid form of 
mandatory and voluntary mediation.  The mediation is mandatory, but it 
takes place after a binding arbitration decision.  The parties are free to 
pursue a licensing agreement in the mediation or they can stonewall the 
mediation and rely solely on the arbitration award.  Arb-med works 
extremely well for Group B disputes because the party committed to the 
adversarial interest will desire to use bluff and delay tactics against the 
other party.  Arb-med defeats the purpose of this strategy: the party must 
decide to accept the verdict or work to reach an agreement.  If the 
adversarial party does not desire the binding decision, that party will 
quickly shift to the hybrid during the mediation phase.  If the adversarial 
party wants the binding decision, the parties may forego the wasted 
negotiations. 
C.  Group C Disputes 
In this group, both parties are committed to the adversarial interest.  
To reach an agreement, both parties must shift to the hybrid.  While this 
dual shift is possible, it is unlikely.  Additionally, Group C encompasses 
disputes where, although both parties are not necessarily committed to 
the adversarial interest, the dispute needs to advance to trial or 
arbitration.  For instance, the dispute may present a novel question of 
law where a precedent must be established.  Mediation is not appropriate 
in all cases, and this scenario is a glowing example.  Between these two 
parties mediation would constitute wasted time and expense.  The 
Proposal bypasses mediation altogether in these disputes, relying on the 
court to decide whether the parties will go to trial or arbitration. 
D.  Determining the Parties’ Classifications 
Under the Proposal, the court will have a board of mediators and 
arbitrators specializing in all areas of intellectual property.  Each party 
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will submit an “ADR Brief” to the court, which the court will advance to 
the board of mediators and arbitrators.212  The plaintiff must submit its 
ADR Brief within 20 days of filing the complaint.  The defendant must 
submit its ADR Brief within 20 days of filing the answer.  In the ADR 
Brief, the parties will provide a statement of the case as well as a 
summary of their proposed arguments.  The parties will further provide 
statements of: (1) their willingness to settle the dispute; (2) their 
willingness to enter a licensing agreement; (3) their preferred form of 
dispute resolution; and (4) if applicable, their reasons why the case 
should proceed to trial.  The court’s mediators and arbitrators will serve 
on three-member panels.  The panels will review the ADR Briefs and 
classify the parties as committed to the fundamental interest, adversarial 
interest, or the hybrid.  After classifying the parties, the panel will use 
the chart to refer the dispute to the appropriate format and inform the 
court of the panel’s decision. 
The parties will not exchange ADR Briefs.  The parties will only 
submit confirmation letters to each other that the ADR Brief has been 
submitted.  Preventing the parties from exchanging ADR Briefs will 
preserve the integrity of the Proposal.  If the parties exchanged ADR 
Briefs, the defendant will always have the chance to abuse the process 
by falsely representing its interest commitment.  Moreover, both parties 
will be less forthcoming in their briefs if the briefs are exchanged.  The 
purpose of the ADR Brief is to facilitate the panel’s decision in 
classifying the dispute to efficiently resolve the dispute.  If the parties 
exchanged briefs, the parties would always have an incentive to present 
false representations in the brief to gain a tactical advantage.  However, 
these false representations would only hinder an agreement and thus 
injure the parties. 
If the dispute falls into Group A or Group B, the court will refer the 
case to mediation or arb-med as the chart dictates.  Also, if both parties 
indicate in their ADR Briefs that mediation is their preferred form of 
dispute resolution, the panel will refer the case to mediation.  The panel 
may forego any review in these disputes.  At this point, the Proposal will 
follow typical procedures for mediation and arb-med.  For mediation, the 
parties will select the mediator.  For arb-med, the parties will select an 
arbitrator and a mediator.  In arb-med sessions under the Proposal, the 
arbitrator will never serve as the mediator.  If the dispute falls into 
 
 212. The board of mediators and arbitrators will consist of experts in all areas of intellectual 
property much like the Program’s board.  See http://www.ilnd.uscourts.gov/legal/wdadr/ (last 
visited 10/26/03). 
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Group C, the panel will forward the decision to the court along with a 
recommendation of whether the case should be settled through trial or 
binding arbitration.  The court will have the discretion to decide whether 
the dispute proceeds to arbitration or litigation. 
E.  The Facial Inequity of Binding v. Non-Binding ADR 
Under the Proposal, parties in a Group A dispute enter non-binding 
ADR whereas parties in a Group B dispute enter binding ADR.  
However, the Proposal does not show favoritism to parties in Group A.  
Rather, the Proposal attempts to give these parties the greatest flexibility 
in reaching an agreement, for they are the most likely to reach an 
agreement.  If the mediation is unsuccessful, the mediator will refer the 
case back to the court along with an opinion of whether the case should 
proceed to trial or arbitration.  The court will then set the case for 
resolution in the proper forum.  The Proposal does not adopt the med-arb 
format given the weakness of this ADR form.  Mediation derives its 
success from the parties’ abilities to discuss freely all aspects of the 
dispute.  Under med-arb, the parties have a significant incentive to hold 
back information and objectives with the looming threat of binding 
arbitration soon following the mediation. 
Parties in Group B disputes enter arb-med to foster an agreement.  
The parties enter mediation only after a final decision has been made by 
the arbitrator.  Once in mediation, the parties know there is an envelope 
containing a decision that declares them as the winner or loser.  The 
mediator can use this decision as an effective tool for intense reality 
testing.  The parties experience the “anything can happen” feeling 
described by Judge Chasanow,213 and they still have an opportunity to 
settle rather than gamble on the ruling.  The arb-med format fosters 
agreement whereas the med-arb format stifles agreement.  The Proposal 
subjects all parties in Group A and Group B to the same levels of 
binding and non-binding ADR, but it switches the order and timing to 
foster agreement between the parties. 
Also, using the arb-med format for Group B disputes will defeat a 
potential abuse of process by the parties.  One drawback to mediation is 
that a party may falsely represent its intentions to enter mediation in 
order to gain additional discovery.  In other words, an OA could falsely 
represent itself as an O in the ADR Brief.  By doing so, the dispute 
would be referred to mediation even though OA has no intention of 
 
 213. Eveleth, supra note 175, at 8. 
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settling the dispute.  Thus, OA could abuse the mediation process to gain 
additional information about the infringer and delay the resolution 
process.  Arb-med alleviates this problem by creating a disincentive to 
abuse the mediation process.  If an OA falsely represents itself as an O, it 
will first subject itself to a binding arbitration.  A party committed to the 
adversarial interest can gain nothing by falsely holding itself out as 
committed to the hybrid. 
VI.  EFFECTS OF THE PROPOSAL 
The Proposal presents a sophisticated dispute resolution program 
for intellectual property disputes that best serves the parties’ interests.  
The parties themselves gain the most benefits from the Proposal.  The 
parties enjoy a more efficient, cost-effective method of resolving their 
disputes.  They get to avoid the hardships and mental anguish associated 
with litigation.  The Proposal focuses on their interests, and they have 
complete power in forming the solutions.  Courts benefit from the 
Proposal as well by allowing mediation, arbitration, and arb-med to clear 
up jam-packed dockets.  The significant decrease in discovery, motion 
practice, and jury selection will allow courts to divert attention to more 
pressing matters.  Judges can devote their efforts to intellectual property 
cases presenting novel questions of law and other disputes properly 
suited for trial. 
The Proposal proves most challenging for attorneys.  While this 
article has expounded upon the perils of litigation for clients, litigation is 
an attractive option for lawyers.  While litigation is difficult work, it 
does grant lawyers the benefit of repetition and familiarity.  If every 
dispute enters litigation with no possibility of ADR, the lawyer takes the 
same approach for every case: file the claim or answer, undergo 
discovery, contemplate settlement, engage in motion practice, and then 
prepare for trial until the ever likely 11th hour settlement.  For 
arbitration, the preparation is quite similar.  It is the mediation 
component of the Proposal that mandates additional preparation by the 
attorneys. 
Mediation provides a number of pitfalls for which the attorney must 
prepare.  In mediation, the client actively participates in the resolution.  
While this is great from the client’s perspective, it is nothing short of a 
nightmare for attorneys.  Every attorney has a war story of a client 
dooming the case at some point during litigation.214  If a client can doom 
 
 214. During a clerkship, this author worked on a case where the client had allowed a default 
judgment to be entered against him before he ever notified his lawyer.  Countless other examples 
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the case during litigation (where the client does not actively participate 
in the resolution), imagine the damage the client can cause in mediation 
where he speaks freely to the opposing party.  Attorneys must spend 
additional hours and days preparing clients for mediation, that would be 
unnecessary in preparing for litigation.  The attorney must prepare the 
client thoroughly for everything that can be said, that cannot be said, and 
the time to say it.  Once in the mediation, both the attorney and client 
will talk at some point.  They must carefully review their strategies to 
ensure they stay on the same page throughout the mediation.  An 
attorney using hardball tactics in the mediation may falsely impress upon 
the client that the attorney is deviating from their game plan. 
Moreover, a successful mediation presents danger for the attorney.  
Even though the parties reach an agreement, the attorneys still must 
reduce the agreement to a proper contract.  While the litigators 
themselves usually draft the mediation agreements, it is a good idea to 
involve corporate and antitrust lawyers to finalize the agreement.215  
Especially in complex litigation, a poorly drafted mediation agreement 
may provide a springboard for further disputes.216  After all the 
preparation and work with the client before and during the mediation, 
the attorney must exercise the most caution at the conclusion of a 
successful mediation. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
Through the use of mediation, arbitration, arb-med, and even 
litigation, the Proposal sets forth a program to effectively resolve 
intellectual property disputes based upon the parties’ interests.  
Ironically, the Proposal imposes the most challenges upon attorneys.  
Following the spirit of the law, there is no better way to design such a 
sophisticated program.  Law exists to govern and protect the people; 
meeting their needs should always take precedence.  Alleviating the 
court dockets serves as a natural consequence of meeting the parties’ 
needs.  If the judicial process is able to promote justice more efficiently, 
the parties receive the benefits.  By placing additional burdens on 
attorneys, the Proposal meets the needs of the people and entrusts to 
attorneys the responsibilities they have sworn to uphold.  Attorneys for 
intellectual property clients must effectively evaluate the client’s 
 
abound and often make interesting conversations among attorneys at dinners and parties. 
 215. Paul R. Gupta, Settlement Agreements and IP Disputes: Practice Pointers for 
Practitioners, 19 E-COMMERCE L. & STRATEGY 1 (2002). 
 216. Id. 
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advantages and risks calculus to prepare the client for every form of 
dispute resolution.  By doing so, attorneys will assist clients in properly 
formulating legal strategies to maximize the value of their IPAs.  The 
Proposal will allow more of these strategies to end in a sit-down with 
Don Corleone rather than a costly full-scale war. 
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